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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In paraqraph 2 of its Statement of Facts, the respondent
(Tax Commission) refers to the amount in issue as "11,855.97 plus
interest accruing daily at $3.59."
have begun accruing after 1986.

That interest would apparently

However, it would be well to

have a calculation of the resulting total including interest.
As indicated in the Brief of the Petitioner (Superior)
the Auditing Division of the Tax Commission asserted that the
total amount owing as of February 15, 1991, was $15,622.32.

R. 19-20.

Adding interest since then at the daily rate specified by the Tax
Commission, the total is over $17,500.
In paragraph 6 of its Statement of Facts, the Tax Commission
simply states that its Informal Decision issued on May 5, 1988
upheld the tax assessment.

However, that Decision admittedly was

ambiguous.
The Order of the Tax Commission dated February 27, 1991
included the following statement:
Upon a reading of the Informal Decision, it
is aoparent that the Decision is not clear.
It is understandable why the parties do not
agree on the interpretation of the Decision
and why it reauires further interpretation. R. 51.
This relates also to paragraph 9 of the Tax Commission's
Statement of Facts, wherein it was stated that "Superior continued
to claim that the Tax Commission's position was confusing."
Clearly, not only did Superior make that claim, but the
Tax Commission so found.

Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Tax Commission's rules did not require Superior

to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all.
Whether or not the water softener was sold after a
period of leasing, it was last personal property when it was owned
by Superior.

It did not remain personal property after the salef

but became part of the real property.

Thus the applicable rules

provided for sales tax only on the materials purchased by Superior.
2.

The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act required the

Tax Commission to enact a rule before charging Superior with the
duty of collecting much more sales tax from each buyer who purchased
a water softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than
from a buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all.
The Tax Commission has not shown that a rule dealing
with the sales tax applicable to the sale of a fixture that had
previously been leased for a period of time would affect only
Superior, rather than a class of persons.
Rules and statutes are construed favorable to the taxpayer,
and the Tax Commission cannot collect taxes based on a new or
different interpretation without first enacting a corresponding rule.
3.

Superior's actions, taken in good faith, do not evidence

ignorance of the law.
Superior makes the argument that its good faith should
excuse it from any retroactive requirement it remit taxes it did
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not and cannot collect.

However, that argument does not admit nor

demonstrate any ignorance of clear law.
4.

The Tax Commission violated suoerior's due process rights

since the tax commission's requirements were vague; and the remedies
for this violation are not barred.
Superior could not have reasonably known the amount of
sales tax the Tax Commission asserts it was required to collect.
When Superior was required to remit more than it collected or could
reasonably collect, its oroperty was taken without due process of
law.
These due orocess claims, as well as the elements of a
claim under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, were presented in the Tax
Commission proceedings.

Therefore Superior is entitled to attorney's

fees under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1988.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE TAX COMMISSION'S RULES DID NOT REQUIRE SUPERIOR TO COLLECT

MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM A BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER
AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A BUYER WHO
BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL.
On page 12 of its Brief, the Tax Commission states that
the parties agree that when there is an outright sale of a water
softener, "the charges for labor to install the water softeners
are not subject to sales tax so long as they are separately stated.
Utah Admin. R7;le R865-19-78S (1986)."
It is true the parties agree on the tax treatment of an
outright sale of a water softener.

However, this treatment does

4
not include the necessity of separately stating the installation
charges.
The cited rule, as set forth in the Tax Commission's
Appendix, states, "Installation of personal property to realty is
not subject to tax as explained in regulations S51 and S58."
The regulation S58 aoplies, and includes the following:
a. Tangible personal property sold to real
property contractors and repairmen of real
property is generally subject to tax. The
person who converts the personal property into
real property is considered to be the consumer
of the personal property since he is the last
one to own it as personal property, [Emphasis
added.]
Nothing in that regulation requires the installation
charges to be separately stated.
The regulation S51 does discuss stating installation
charges as a separate charge, but that regulation does not apply
to an outright sale.

It states, "See regulation S58 ... to determine

applicable tax on personal property which becomes a part of real
property."

It then goes on to describe the tax treatment when

tangible personal property is attached to real property but remains
personal property.

As acknowledged on page 12 of the Tax Commissions

Brief, an outright sale of a water softener "is considered a sale
of real property."
Therefore, there is no requirement in an outright sale
for the installation charges to be separately stated.
The Tax Commission goes on to argue that Rule R865-19-51S
does apply where Superior sells a water softener to a customer
after having leased it to that customer for a period of time.
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However, there is no merit to that argument,
As stated in the Tax Commission's Brief, Rule R865-19-51S(E)
"provides that tanqible oersonal property which is attached to
real property, but remains tangible personal property, is subject
to sales tax on the retail selling price of the tangible oersonal
prooerty.11

[Emphasis added.]

Specifically, the languaqe as shown

in the Tax Commission's Appendix is as follows:
Tangible personal property which is attached
to real property, but remains personal property,
is subject to sales tax on the retail selling
price of the oersonal orooerty. [Emphasis added. ]
The underlined language shows that this rule does not
apply when a water softener that was being leased in a home is
sold to the homeowner.

When a water softener is sold to the

homeowner, it becomes real oroperty, and thus it does not remain
personal property.
It does not make sense to argue that a water softener
remains personal property after sale to the homeowner if he had
been leasing it, but not otherwise.

If he buys it from Superior,

then Suoerior was the last one to own the materials as personal
orooerty.

Suoerior was thus the consumer of the personal property,

and under the language of Rule R865-19-58S quoted above, is liable
for the tax.
To make such an argument is to attach significance to
the length of time the water softener has been owned by the contractor
(as personal prooerty) before the sale.

There is nothing in the

rules that changes the nature of any property depending on that factor.
The parts for the water softener are purchased and the
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unit is assembled.

T. 39.

Even though the unit may not be sold

for a year, there is no sales tax on the cost to assemble it.
Then when it is placed in the home, the sale may not yet
be closed.

It may be installed and then the homeowner reneges on

the ourchase.

Or the homeowner may be given a longer period of

time in which to decide whether to ourchase the water softener,
commonly using the softener on a free trial basis.

T. 43.

There is no reason to treat the sale any differently if
the homeowner had been leasinq the water softener for a while.
The lease would not have made its status as oersonal nrooerty any
more permanent.

It is still converted to real property uoon the

sale to the homeowner.

And Rule R865-19-58S as quoted above still

applies.
Thus in any event, when the water softener is sold, it
becomes oart of the real property.

Therefore the only sales tax is

that on the component parts purchased by Superior.
Rule R865-19-51S as quoted above would appiv, on the
other hand, if the water softener were sold and did not become
part of the real property.

For example, suppose a oerson was renting

an apartment and leasing a water softener from Superior, and then
moved out.

If Superior then sold the water softener to a company

managing the apartments, that would appear to be a sale of oersonal
property.

The water softener would have been attached to the real

property, but would have been personal property and would have
remained personal property after the sale.
However, the foregoing example is not an example of the
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sales for which Superior is being assessed the additional amounts.
The sales made by Superior have involved the conversion of personal
property to real property.

They have been governed by Rule

R865-19-58Sf not Rule R865-19-51S.

Thus Superior initially collected

and remitted the proper amount of sales tax, and no additional
amounts were owing.

The additional amounts demanded and paid must

therefore be returned to Superior with interest.
This same result is reached by examination of the case
law interpreting the applicable statutes.

In the case of Utah

Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Com'n, 101 U. 513, 125 P.2d
408 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court demonstrated that contractors are
consumers for purposes of sales tax because they are the last
persons to deal with such objects of tangible personal property
before they lose their identity as such.
In the instant matter, when Superior leased and then
sold a water softener, it was the last owner of the water softener
when it was still classified as personal property.
2.

THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT REQUIRED THE TAX COMMISSION

TO ENACT A RULE BEFORE CHARGING SUPERIOR WITH THE DUTY OF COLLECTING
MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM EACH BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER
AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A BUYER WHO
BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL.
As shown by the foregoing, the Tax Commission rules
provided that Superior would not have to collect sales tax on the
entire sales price of the water softener, even if that softener
had already been leased to the purchaser for a period of time.
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In addition, also as shown above, the case law interpreting
the statutes leads to the same conclusion.
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission asserts that it can
require Superior to remit the sales tax (in an amount four or five
times greater than the amount normally collected in the course of
an outright sale of a water softener) that it should have collected
when a water softener was sold that had been previously leased for
a period of time.
Assuming that such could be required despite the statutes
and interpretive case law, it could only be done prospectively,
pursuant to a rule enacted by the Tax Commission.
That is, perhaps the Tax Commission could enact a rule
providing that once a fixture is treated as personal property by
being taxed as such under a lease oursuant to Section 59-12-103(1)(k)
of the Utah Code, it cannot be changed to real property unless and
until after it has been purchased by the owner of the real property.

The rule could thus clarify that the owner of the real property

would be deemed to hold that fixture as personal property for an
instant so that he would be the consumer of the fixture and sales
tax would be due on the entire sales price.
Not only has the Tax Commission never proposed or adopted
any such rule, but it excuses itself under provisions of the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Its Brief notes that rulemaking is required, and only
required, if the agency actions would affect a class of persons,
rather than merely an individual.

The Tax Commission then argues
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on page 18 that Superior has not shown an effect on anyone else.
"No evidence has been presented to show that other water softener
companies similarly rent and then sell a water softener and might
therefore be affected."
This argument implies that the burden is on Superior to
find other affected persons.
In the first placef the Tax Commission would have much
better access to the data which would orovide information on
leases and subsequent sales of fixtures.

Therefore it should bear

any burden of proof.
In the second place, it would seem that logic could
suffice without the requirement of specific examples.

None of the

other rules cited refer to water softeners, and Superior makes no
suggestion that the Tax Commission should have enacted a rule
pertaining only to water softeners.
It would seem logical to assume that water softeners are
not the only fixtures that are leased.

Likewise it is logical to

assume that water softeners are not the only fixtures leased and
then sometimes sold thereafter.
Therefore, logic and reason demonstrate that there is a
class of persons that would be affected by a rule dealing with the
sales tax aoplicable to the sale of a fixture that had previously
been leased for a period of time.
The Tax Commission also argues on pages 17 and 18 that
no rulemaking is required because the taxing of the transaction at
issue is already described by statute.
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As shown above, the statute, the case law, and the Tax
Commission's rules show that when personal property is attached to
real property and then sold, thus becoming part of the real property,
sales tax is paid on the materials purchased by the contractor, not
on the the total sales price of the fixture.

Thus contrary to the

assertion of the Tax Commission, a different sales tax treatment
of such a purchase would be a change in policy as would mandate a
rule.

Williams v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 720 P.2d 773

(Utah 1986 ) .
Not only does the Tax Commission argue that the statute
already allows it to tax these transactions in that different
manner, but it argues on page 18 that its interpretation of the
statute is "straightforward."

However, that interpretation is

based on the water softener remaining "tangible oersonal property
at the time of the sale."

As indicated above, it is not tangible

oersonal property when owned by the purchaser.

The last oerson to

own it as personal property is the contractor, Superior.
At most, the Tax Commission offers a different plausible
interpretation of the statute.
be applied here.

Such an interpretation should not

Taxing statutes are to be construed favorable to

the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority.

Parson

Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah
1980), Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Com'n, 8
U.2d 144, 329 P.2d 650 (1958).

It follows that the rules of the

taxing authority are to be construed favorable to the taxpayer and
strictly against the taxing authority.
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Thus, in the absence of a clear unambiguous statute
governing the taxation of a sale of a fixture previously leased,
it is necessary the Tax Commission to "formulate, publish and
make available to concerned persons rules which are sufficiently
definite and clear that persons of ordinary intelligence will be able
to understand and abide by them."

Athay v. State, Dept. of Business

Regulation, 626 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah 1981).
The Tax Commission certainly has not yet complied with
that mandate.

Until it does, Superior cannot be held responsible

for remitting sales tax in the amount that the Tax Commission
asserts Superior should have collected it.
3.

SUPERIOR'S ACTIONS, TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, DO NOT EVIDENCE

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.
In its main Brief, Superior argued that the same good
faith which excused it from collecting sales tax based on an
ambiguous Informal Decision should excuse it from collecting
sales tax based on the Tax Commission's interpretation and construction
of statutes and rules, assuming that those statutes and rules were
ambiguous enough to allow such interpretation and construction.
In response, the Tax Commission argued on pages 23 and
24 of its Brief that ignorance and mistake of the law is no excuse,
citing and quoting from various cases.

However, an examination of

the cited cases shows that the law at issue in those cases was clear
and unambiguous, a situation quite different from the instant matter.
For example, the case of Rosseberg v. Holesapple, 123
U. 544, 260 P.2d 563 (1953) involved a person who forfeited the
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principal amount he had loaned, because he sought to exact usurious
payments.

He did not know it was contrary to law.

That did not

helo him.

However, there was no arqument he had not clearly

violated a clear law.
Likewise in the case of Walker Center Corp. v. State Tax
Com'n, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d 888 (1968) there was no question as
to the clarity of the statute mandating the payment of a franchise
tax if a corporation had not been dissolved before the end of the
prior year, nor of the statute setting forth the manner for
accompishing dissolution.

The company had not followed the

statutorily prescribed procedures within the time limit set by
statute, and therefore clearly owed the franchise tax.
The only ignorance claimed was of the procedures for
expediting the dissolution process.

That was the context in which

the agency was excused from volunteering information when none was
sought.
That is much different from the instant matter, when the
statutes and rules appear to be clear, but the agency seeks to
give them a different interpretation retroactively, and excuses
itself from informing a person that had sought interpretive information
on the basis that the interpretation of that specific point was not
asked about.
Thus it is true Superior makes the argument that its good
faith should be considered before assessing it retroactively for
sales tax which the Tax Commission states it should have collected,
but which it did not and cannot collect.

But it is not true that
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Superior was ignorant of any law, and it was certainly not ignorant
of any clear and unambiguous law.
4.

THE TAX COMMISSION VIOLATED SUPERIOR'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

SINCE THE TAX COMMISSION'S REQUIREMENTS WERE VAGUE; AND THE REMEDIES
FOR THIS VIOLATION ARE NOT BARRED.
In its opening Brief, Superior demonstrated that if a
statute is vague, and the noncompliance with the statute results
in the loss of a person's property, then the due process rights of
that person have been violated.

These rights are set forth in the

due process clauses of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7,
and the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, each
providing that Utah shall not deprive any person of property without
due process of law.
In response, on pages 27 to 29 of its Brief, the Tax
c mmission cited and quoted from various cases dealing with due
process rights.

However, an examination of these cases shows that

they do not contradict Superior's position.
As was mentioned above, i

the case of Walker Center

Corp. v. State Tax Com'n, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d 888 (1968) there
wa no allegation of any vagueness in the statute mandating the
payment of a franchise tax if a corporation had not been dissolved
before the end of the prior year, nor in the statute setting forth
the manner for accomplishing dissolution.

The company could not

argue that it did not know of the proscribed or prescribed conduct.
It had not followed the statutorily orescribed procedures within the
time limit set by statute, and therefore clearly owed the franchise
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tax.

Due process did not require the agency to volunteer information

as to procedures available for exoeditinq the dissolution process
when such information had not been requested.
This is much different from the instant matter, where
the Tax Commission claims that Superior should have identified an
ambiguity in the statutory requirements made of it to collect
sales tax, and then asked a question calculated to resolve that
ambiguity.
In the case of Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n, 791
P.2d 511 (Utah 1990) the Supreme Court pointed out that there was
no real claim that the statute was vague as to the proscribed
conduct, but only as to the fine imposed for enqaqing in the
proscribed conduct.
So these cases do not apply to the instant matter.

The

vagueness in this matter goes to the conduct that is proscribed or
prescribed, not the procedures available to facilitate orescribed
conduct nor the penalty for engaging in proscribed conduct.
The Tax Commission also argues that this Court should
not consider Superior's claims based on constitutional due process
rights, nor for attorney's fees for enforcing them, since they
were not mentioned below.
As was mentioned on page 12 of Superior's main Brief,
Superior urged in documents and in argument that its constitutional
due process rights would be violated if it were charged more in sales
tax than it had collected.

R. 29, T. 77, 83.

Specifically, Superior included the following in its
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Brief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated October 25, 1991:
If the Auditing Division wants to impose tax
on those transactions at four or five times
the rate of a straight sale, the Commission
must first approve that concept and adopt a
rule to give notice to all taxpayers of the
requirement. ... Without[] the agency first
adopting rules, taxpayers are not given any
advance notice of the requirements of the
agency. R. 29. [Emphasis added.]
Counsel for Superior also referred to such due process
principles in argument before the Tax Commission:
Without the agency first adopting rules,
taxpayers are not given advance notice of the
requirements of that agency. And it flies in
the face of everything that we regard as
sacred, that there is taxation or there is a
law of — of — the constitutional bar against
ex post facto laws. T. 77. [Emphasis added.]
[Y]ou canft criticize them [Superior] for
having made a mistake when their instructions
were not clear. I just think it's so inherently
a part of even-handed justice that they be
told up front what the problem is and what
they've got to do. They don't try — cannot
— I tried to interpret these rules for my
client. I had a difficult time trying to come
up with the same conclusions that the Tax
Commission did. I don't even know if professional
advice would have helped. And I just think
it's manifestly improper and wrong to impose
this obligation on them without the Commission
engaging in the requirements of what's required
under the statutes of the State of Utah, -*nd
that is to give everybody clear, unequivocable
direction and advice for the execution of the
fact. T. 83. [Emphasis added.]
Thus the Tax Commission was presented with Superior's
Constitutional due process claims, but affirmatively chose to
ignore and disregard such claims.
The Tax Commission also argued on page 26 of its Brief
that no attorney's fees should be awarded because Superior "failed
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to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 (1979) (hereinafter
'section 1983') in the previous proceedings before the Tax Commission."
However, the elements of such a claimf as set forth in
the case of Signore v. City of McKeesoort, Pa., 680 F.Supp. 200
(W.D.Pa. 1988) cited in Superior's opening Brief, were presented
in the previous proceedings before the Tax Commission.
That case set forth the three elements forming a cause
of action under Section 1983:
First, the olaintiff must allege that he has
been deorived of a right, orivilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States. ...
Second, the plaintiff must allege that the
defendant subjected the plaintiff to this
deprivation, or caused him to be so subjected.
...

Lastly, the plaintiff must allege that the
defendant acted under color of a statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of a
State. Id. at 203.
As set forth above, Superior argued and alleged that the
Tax Commission was depriving it of its Constitutional rights.

Since

the Tax Commission was the opposing party and an arm of the State,
this satisfied all of the requirements under Section 1983.
Thus Superior did raise the Constitutional due process
issue before the Tax Commission, did raise a claim under Section
1983, and is entitled attorney's fees under Section 1988 upon
reversal of the Decision and Order of the Tax Commission.
A" set forth in Superior's ouening Brief, Suoerior is
entitled to such attorney's fees even if this Court does not reach
the issue of the violation of the United States Constitution.
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah A D D . 1990).
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Furthermore, Superior is entitled to its attorney's fees
for appellate work and for time spent litigating entitlement to
the fees.

Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1980).
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commissions rules show that Superior collected

and remitted the appropriate amount of sales and use taxes on
water softeners it sold.

The fact that some of these units had

been leased first made no difference under the rules of the Tax
Commission, nor under the statutes as interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court.
It is unreasonable for the Tax Commission to now charge
Superior over $15,000 for taxes it did not collect, especially
where no clear rule covering the matter had been enacted.
Superior's constitutionally protected due process rights
have been violated by the Tax Commission's deprivation of Superior's
property under color of law.

Therefore this Court should order

that the amount collected by the Tax Commission pursuant to its
Decision and Order of February 6, 1992 be returned, and that
Decision and Order be vacated.
Furthermore, Superior should be awarded its costs including
attorney fees herein.
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